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UNSETTLING DRUG PATENT SETTLEMENTS:
A FRAMEWORK FOR
PRESUMPTIVE ILLEGALITYt
Michael A. Carrier*
A tidal wave of high drug prices has recently crashed across the
U.S. economy. One of the primary culprits has been the increase in
agreements by which brand-name drug manufacturers and generic
firms have settled patent litigation. The framework for such agree-
ments has been the Hatch-Waxman Act, which Congress enacted in
1984. One of the Act's goals was to provide incentives for generics
to challenge brand-name patents. But brand firms have recently
paid generics millions of dollars to drop their lawsuits and refrain
from entering the market.
These reverse-payment settlements threaten significant harm.
Courts nonetheless have recently blessed them, explaining that the
agreements reduce costs, increase innovation, and are reasonable
based on the presumption of validity accorded to patents. Although
scholars and the Federal Trade Commission have voiced strong ar-
guments against courts' leniency, these have fallen on judicial deaf
ears.
In this Article, I apply the framework that the Supreme Court ar-
ticulated in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP,' which underscored the importance in antitrust analy-
sis of a regulatory regime addressing the challenged activity. In
particular, the Hatch- Waxman Act provides Congress's views on in-
novation and competition in the drug industry, freeing courts from
the thorny task of reconciling the patent and antitrust laws. Unfor-
tunately, mechanisms that Congress employed to encourage patent
challenges-such as an exclusivity period for the first generic to
challenge validity-have been twisted into barriers preventing
t © 2009 Michael A. Carrier. All rights reserved.
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competition. Antitrust can play a central role in resuscitating the
drafters' intentions and promoting competition.
Given the Act's clear purpose to promote patent challenges, as well
as the parties' aligned incentives and the severe anticompetitive po-
tential of reverse payments, courts should treat such settlements as
presumptively illegal. If the parties can demonstrate that the pay-
ments represent a reasonable assessment of litigation success, then
they can rebut this presumption. If not, courts should conclude that
the agreements violate the antitrust laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Consumers spend billions of dollars on prescription drugs. Senior citi-
zens choose between medicine and food. Federal and state governments
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suffer from rapidly growing expenses. General Motors estimates that it in-
creases the price of its cars by $1500 because of health-care costs.'
In short, a tidal wave of high drug prices is crashing across the U.S.
economy. One explanation can be traced to the increase in agreements by
which brand-name drug manufacturers and generic firms have settled patent
litigation.3 The framework for such agreements has been the Hatch-Waxman
Act,4 which Congress enacted in 1984. One of the Act's goals was to pro-
vide incentives for generics to challenge brand-name patents. But brand
firms have recently paid generics millions of dollars to drop their lawsuits
and refrain from entering the market.5
Of course, firms with valid patents can charge high prices and exclude
competitors. That is the intended purpose of the patent system, and is espe-
cially needed for the difficult, expensive process of developing marketable
drugs. At the same time, however, companies cannot lawfully use invalid
patents to restrict competition. Challenges to invalid patents, in fact, benefit
consumers and reduce prices.
Certain settlement agreements could be justified by objective assess-
ments of the patent's validity. But in recent years, agreements have more
frequently included large payments from brand patentees to generic chal-
lengers. These reverse payments, which differ from typical licensing
payments that flow from challengers to patentees, may even exceed what the
generic could have earned by entering the market. Further raising suspicion,
many of the patents are not valid. In the 1990s, generics won nearly 75 per-
cent of their challenges to patents on drugs such as Prozac, Zantac, Taxol,
and Plantinol.6 Consumers saved almost $10 billion from the introduction of
generic competition on these four products alone.
Reverse payments for generics to delay entering the market also are
concerning because of the parties' aligned incentives. By delaying generic
entry, the brand firm can increase its monopoly profits. It can then use a por-
tion of these profits to pay the generic more than it would have received by
2. Eduardo Porter, Japanese Cars, American Retirees; Makers Put Health and Pension
Burdens Squarely on the Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2006, at CI. See generally Jon Leibowitz,
Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Prepared Statement Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Anticompeti-
tive Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Benefits of a Legislative Solution, at 1,
Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/071701oralstatement.pdf.
3. See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
4. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
7. Generic Pharmaceuticals: Marketplace Access and Consumer Issues: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 107th Cong. 61 (2002) (statement of
Kathleen D. Jaeger, President and CEO, Generic Pharm. Ass'n), available at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 107_senatehearings&docid=f:90155.pdf. See
generally Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Prepared Statement Before the S. Spec.
Comm. on Aging, Barriers to Generic Entry, at 10, July 20, 2006 [hereinafter Barriers to Generic
Entry], http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/07/P052103BarrierstoGenericEntryTestimonySenateO7202006.pdf.
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entering the market. From an antitrust perspective, these payments for delay
threaten to divide markets, a particularly egregious offense eliminating
competition between rivals.
Despite the concerns presented by reverse-payment settlements, courts
have recently blessed them.' They have explained that the agreements re-
duce costs and increase innovation. They have referred to settlements as
"natural by-products" of the Act. And they have pointed to patents' pre-
sumption of validity in demonstrating the agreements' reasonableness.
Although scholars and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which en-
forces the antitrust laws in the drug industry, have voiced strong arguments
against courts' leniency, these have fallen on judicial deaf ears.9
In this Article, I explain why settlement agreements with reverse pay-
ments should be presumptively illegal. I apply the framework that the
Supreme Court articulated in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of
Curtis V Trinko, LLP,'° which underscored the importance in antitrust anal-
ysis of a regulatory regime covering the challenged activity. In particular,
the Hatch-Waxman Act provides Congress's views on innovation and com-
petition in the drug industry, freeing courts from the thorny task of
reconciling the patent and antitrust laws.
The intersection of the patent and antitrust laws has presented courts with
significant challenges. The foundation of the patent system is the right to ex-
clude. This right allows inventors to recover their costs and obtain profits.
Relatedly, it discourages "free riders" who imitate the invention and-because
they have no costs to recover-undercut the price. The right to exclude, in
short, is designed to increase invention."
But the very exclusion at the heart of the patent system might seem sus-
picious to the antitrust laws, which focus on harms to competition. These
laws presume that competition leads to lower prices, higher output, and
more innovation. They anticipate that certain agreements between rivals or
conduct by monopolists prevents consumers from enjoying these benefits.
There is no compass to guide courts that consider harms to competition that
could arise from exclusion but are intended by the patent system.1
2
By encouraging generic patent challenges but also providing for patent-
term extensions and marketing-exclusivity periods, the Hatch-Waxman Act
offered a delicate balance between competition and innovation. Unfortu-
nately, mechanisms that Congress employed to encourage patent
8. See infra Part II.
9. Commentators also have offered more deferential approaches. For example, some schol-
ars have advocated treatment under the Rule of Reason (by which courts consider an agreement's
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects) because of conceivable reasons why settlements might
not occur without payment from the brand to the generic firm. See infra notes 254-264 and accom-
panying text.
10. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
11. Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innova-
tion, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1049-50 (2003).
12. Id. at 1050-53.
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challenges-such as an exclusivity period for the first generic to challenge
validity-have been twisted into barriers preventing competition. Antitrust
can play a central role in resuscitating the drafters' intentions and promoting
competition.
Given the Act's clear purpose to promote patent challenges, as well as
the parties' aligned incentives and the severe anticompetitive potential of
reverse payments, courts should treat such settlements as presumptively ille-
gal. If the parties can demonstrate that the payments represent a reasonable
assessment of litigation success, then they can rebut this presumption. If not,
courts should conclude that the agreements violate the antitrust laws. Such a
conclusion applies not only to final settlements, which dispose of patent
litigation, but also interim settlements, which do not end the litigation but
tend to prolong it and delay entry.
Part I introduces the Hatch-Waxman Act, exploring its purpose, text, and
mixed success. Part II discusses four representative cases illustrating courts'
increased leniency toward reverse-payment agreements. Part III demon-
strates the flaws in judicial analyses. Part IV justifies a framework for
presumptive illegality. It explains the importance of the relevant regulatory
framework and demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the Act's competition
mechanisms. Part IV also describes the uniquely concerning aspects and
potentially severe anticompetitive harm of reverse payments. Finally, it
shows how the settling parties can rebut the presumption of illegality.
In short, this Article offers a new framework for the judicial treatment of
reverse payments. Congress, of course, could enact other potential solutions.
For example, recently-introduced legislation would prohibit agreements by
which the generic firm receives "anything of value" in exchange for not re-
searching, developing, manufacturing, marketing, or selling the generic
product. 3 The solution I offer, in contrast, directly addresses the courts' er-
roneous decisions, offers a more appropriate framework for judicial
analysis, and restores the Hatch-Waxman Act to its intended purposes.
I. HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
A. General Purposes
In 1984, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (Hatch-Waxman Act). 4 In doing so, the legislature
sought to increase generic competition and foster innovation in the pharma-
ceutical industry.
13. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111 th Cong. § 29(a) (2009).
14. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)). The Act was originally called the
Waxman-Hatch Act. Kevin J. McGough, Preserving the Compromise: The Plain Meaning of Wax-
man-Hatch Market Exclusivity, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 487, 487 (1990).
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First, Congress sought to promote generic competition. Generic drugs
have the same active ingredients, dosage, administration, performance, and
safety as patented brand drugs. 5 Despite the equivalence, generic manufactur-
ers were required, at the time of the Act, to engage in lengthy and expensive
trials to demonstrate safety and effectiveness. The Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) approval process took several years, and because the required tests
constituted infringement, generics could not begin the process during the
patent term.16 They therefore waited until the end of the term to begin these
activities, which prevented them from entering the market until two or three
years after the patent's expiration. At the time Congress enacted Hatch-
Waxman, there was no generic equivalent for roughly 150 drugs whose patent
terms had lapsed."
The drafters of the Act lamented the "practical extension" of the pat-
entee's "monopoly position" beyond expiration. 8 Relatedly, they sought to
ensure the provision of "low-cost, generic drugs for millions of Ameri-
cans."'19 Generic competition would save consumers, as well as the federal
and state governments, millions of dollars each year.20 And it would "do
more to contain the cost of elderly care than perhaps anything else this Con-
gress has passed.'
One of the tools used by the legislature to accelerate generic entry was a
resuscitation of the experimental use defense. In the case of Roche Products,
Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,22 the Federal Circuit had held that the ge-
neric firm committed infringement by experimenting with the active
ingredient in the brand's patented sleeping pill so as to facilitate FDA test-
ing. The court explained that the generic's use was "solely for business
reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly phi-
losophical inquiry.' 23 In addition, it refused to interpret the defense to cover
"scientific inquiry" when "that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not in-
substantial commercial purposes. 24
Congress reversed this holding in the Hatch-Waxman Act. It exempted
from infringement the manufacture, use, or sale of a patented invention for
15. FDA.gov, Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, http://www.fda.gov/buyonlineguide/
generics-q&a.htm (last visited May 18, 2009).
16. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 38 (1998) [hereinafter CBO
STUDY].
17. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650.
18. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688.
19. 130 CONG. REC. 24427 (1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
20. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
21. 130 CONG. REC. 24427 (statement of Rep. Waxman).
22. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
23. Id. at 863.
24. Id.
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uses "reasonably related to the development and submission of information"
under a federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.25
Congress also sought to promote generic competition by creating a new
process for obtaining FDA approval. Before Hatch-Waxman, generic compa-
nies that offered products identical to approved drugs needed to independently
26prove safety and efficacy. One reason that generics chose not to bring prod-
ucts to the market after a patent's expiration was the expense and time
involved in replicating clinical studies. As discussed in more detail in the next
section, the Act created a new type of drug application that allowed the ge-
neric to rely on the brand's studies, thereby accelerating entry.27
Also discussed below, the legislature increased competition by fashion-
ing market exclusivity.28 In particular, it encouraged generics to challenge
invalid or noninfringed patents by creating a 180-day period of marketing
exclusivity for the first generic firm to do so.
In addition to promoting generic competition, the Act increased incen-
tives for innovation. Before 1962, companies had needed only to
demonstrate a drug's safety to gain FDA approval. 29 But amendments to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1962 required manufac-
turers to show not only that a drug was safe but also that it was effective for
its intended use.30 As a result, brand firms were required to undertake addi-
tional years of testing and clinical trials after the patent's issuance. Such a
development delayed commercialization and substantially eroded the effec-
tive patent term.3
The industry thus faced an "innovation crisis." The number of new
chemical entities entering human testing fell 81 percent from the late 1950s
until the late 1970s.32 New drug compounds and dosage forms also de-
creased. Firms' research and development declined because of increased
25. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)(2006). In 2005, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the excep-
tion, finding that it covered activities that did not ultimately lead to information included in an FDA
submission. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 207 (2005).
26. Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History,
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 589-90 (2003).
27. See infra Section I.B.
28. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
29. Stephanie Greene, A Prescription for Change: How the Medicare Act Revises Hatch-
Waxman to Speed Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 30 J. CoRP. L. 309, 313 (2005).
30. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 26, at 588.
31. Id.
32. Maureen S. May et al., New drug development during and after a period of regulatory
change: Clinical research activity of major United States pharmaceutical firms, 1958 to 1979, 33
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY THERAPEUTICS 691, 691 (1983).
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investments but reduced returns.33 And U.S. drug companies shifted their
34
research overseas.
Much of this crisis was traced to the decline in the effective patent life,
the period between FDA approval and patent expiration. This period was
reduced as manufacturers engaged in more extensive tests, delaying the
drug's marketing. Before the 1962 amendments, the effective patent life
nearly matched the 17-year patent term.35 By 1981, it had fallen to less than
36
seven years.
The legislature thus extended the patent term. The extension currently
amounts to half the time the drug is in clinical trials plus the period spent
awaiting FDA approval after trials. The extension can last up to five years
and, together with the remaining patent term, can give the patentee up to
fourteen years of protection.
37
Congress also provided for periods of market exclusivity not based on
patents. A company that offers a drug with a new active ingredient is entitled
to either four or five years of exclusivity.38 Because the FDA cannot receive
generic applications during this period, the practical exclusivity period is
extended by another two years, the time it typically takes the FDA to ap-
prove an application.3 9 Similarly, new clinical investigations essential to
approval receive three years of exclusivity.40 The FDA has applied this form
of exclusivity to new dosage forms, new uses, and adoption of over-the-
counter status.4'
Finally, Congress granted to patent holders an automatic 30-month stay
of FDA approval. This period, explained more fully below,41 provides an
additional exclusionary right benefiting brand firms who-even without
33. John R. Virts & J. Fred Weston, Returns to Research and Development in the U.S. Phar-
maceutical Industry, I MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 103, 110 (1980).
34. JOHN W. EGAN ET AL., ECONOMICS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 105-06 (1982);
see James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price Com-
petition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 450 (1986).
35. Wheaton, supra note 34, at 45 1-52.
36. Id.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c), (g)(6) (2006). See generally Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 26, at
591.
38. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2006). The exclusivity period is four years for generic filers
certifying patent invalidity or noninfringement and five years for other generic failures. Id.
39. See JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 350 (2005). As described more
fully below, other factors (including the brand firm's automatic stay and litigation) increase the
delay. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text; infra Part II.
40. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c), (g)(6) (2006). See generally Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 26, at
591.
42. See Elizabeth H. Dickinson, FDA's Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations, 54 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 195, 201 (1999).
[Vol. 108:37
Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements
obtaining a preliminary injunction-will not face generic competition for a
period of time.43
The Act's drafters emphasized the equilibrium between competition and
innovation. Representative Henry Waxman underscored the "fundamental
balance of the bill,"" and the Energy and Commerce Committee Report ex-
plained that allowing early generic challenges "fairly balanced" the
exclusionary rights of patent owners with the "rights of third parties" to con-
test validity and market products not covered by the patent. 45 Similarly, the
Judiciary Committee Report concluded that the Committee "has merely
done what the Congress has traditionally done" in IP law: "balance the need
to stimulate innovation against the goal of furthering the public interest. 46
In fact, the equilibrium was even more finely calibrated than the tradi-
tional balance between innovation and competition that underlies IP law. For
Congress placed on the innovation side of the ledger not only patent term
extensions but also (1) nonpatent market exclusivity for new chemical enti-
ties and new clinical investigations and (2) an automatic 30-month stay for
brand firms that sued generics that had challenged the patent's invalidity or
claimed noninfringement. According to one of the chief negotiators, the ex-
clusivity period for new drugs "was the key to the compromise.'
In short, Congress responded to the problems of insufficient generic en-
try and inadequate innovation through a carefully calibrated balance among
patent term extension, nonpatent exclusivity, and generic competition.
B. Competition-Promoting Framework
Of the policies underlying Hatch-Waxman, generic competition has en-
gendered the most attention and concern. The antitrust issues that have
arisen under the statute have flowed from provisions intended to expedite
generic entry. To understand the relevant framework, it is necessary to ex-
plore the provisions of the Act, as well as the process by which the FDA
approves drugs. Neither of these offers the simplest regime ever created.
A company that wishes to market a new drug must receive approval
from the FDA. To do so, it files a New Drug Application (NDA), which con-
sists of thousands of pages and includes information on numerous
categories, including clinical trial data.4
43. FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY 42 (2002) [hereinafter GENERIC DRUG STUDY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/
genericdrugstudy.pdf.
44. 130 CONG. REC. 24425 (1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
45. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 28 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2661.
46. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2714.
47. Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Out-
lived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 406 (1999).
48. GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 43, at 5; THOMAS, supra note 39, at 306.
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The Hatch-Waxman Act allows generic firms to avoid the expensive and
lengthy NDA process by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA). To do this, the applicant must show that its drug possesses the
same active ingredient, route of administration, bioequivalence (rate and
extent of drug absorption), and other characteristics of the brand. 49 If it can
make this showing, it can rely on the brand's safety and effectiveness stud-
ies, dispensing with the need for independent preclinical or clinical studies.
Brand firms filing NDAs also are required to identify patents they be-
lieve would be infringed by the marketing of generic drugs.5 When the FDA
approves the NDA, it lists the patents in a publication known as the Orange
Book.5 Named for its orange cover (but now published in electronic form
and accessible on the internet), the publication contains a list of all the drugs
approved for marketing in the United States.53
An ANDA applicant must provide one of four certifications for each pat-
ent listed in the Orange Book relating to the relevant NDA. It can certify that
(I) no patent information appears in the Orange Book,
(II) the patent has expired,
(III) it will not seek approval until the patent expires, or
(IV) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the generic drug.54
For the first two certifications, the FDA can approve the ANDA immedi-
ately. For the third, approval is granted when the patent expires. It is the
fourth certification that has resulted in settlement agreements raising anti-
trust concern.
Upon filing such a certification, an ANDA applicant must provide notice
within twenty days to the patent and NDA holders.55 Such notice must de-
tail support for its claim of invalidity or noninfringement. 6 If the patent
holder (typically the brand firm) does not bring an infringement suit
within forty-five days, the FDA may approve the ANDA as soon as the
regulatory requirements are satisfied. 57
If, in contrast, the patent holder sues within forty-five days, it receives
an automatic 30-month stay of FDA approval. The stay operates like a pre-
49. GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 43, at 5.
50. Id.
51. THOMAS, supra note 39, at 15.
52. The technical name is "Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evalua-
tions." ELECTRONIC ORANGE BOOK (2009), http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/.
53. THOMAS, supra note 39, at 327.
54. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (200). See generally THOMAS, supra note 39, at 313.
55. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii). The 20-day limit was added in the 2003 amendments
to the Act. Erika Lietzan & David E. Korn, Issues in the Interpretation of 180-Day Exclusivity, 62
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 49, 54 (2007).
56. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II).
57. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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liminary injunction, preventing the ANDA applicant from marketing its
product for a period of roughly thirty months (or less if a court determines
that the patent is invalid or not infringed)." As a practical matter, the 30-
month stay approximates the 25-month periods for (1) FDA approval of ge-
neric applicants filing paragraph IV certifications that are not sued and (2)
the average period between the filing of a complaint and a district court de-
cision.59 Even though the generic has not entered the market, the paragraph
IV certification is treated as an artificial act of infringement that allows the
patentee to sue before entry.6°
To encourage challenges to potentially invalid drug patents, the Act
grants a 180-day period of marketing exclusivity to the first applicant filing
a "substantially complete" ANDA with a paragraph IV certification. 6' Dur-
ing the period, which begins after the first commercial marketing of the
drug, the FDA cannot approve other ANDAs for the same product.
62
C. 2003 Revisions
In 2003, Congress enacted the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improve-
ment, and Modernization Act.63 Three of the Act's most important changes
addressed abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by limiting patent holders to a
single 30-month stay, establishing forfeiture events causing ANDA appli-
cants to lose the exclusive 180-day marketing period, and requiring parties
to provide notice of settlement agreements to the antitrust enforcement
agencies.
The single 30-month stay provision was a "centerpiece" of the amend-
ments, designed to "allow[] lower-priced generic products to enter the
market more quickly.' 6 Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a brand firm could
wait until a generic filed an ANDA and then list an additional patent in the
Orange Book. If the generic then filed a paragraph IV certification, the
brand could sue and receive another 30-month stay. As an example of such
behavior, GlaxoSmithKline, by obtaining multiple 30-month stays, blocked
58. Id. The period could extend an additional twelve months depending on when the generic
filed its paragraph IV certification. id. § 355tj)(5)(F)(ii). See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay:
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1566
n.50 (2006).
59. GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 43, at 39.
60. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006); see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661
(1990).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(B)(iv). Multiple applicants that file paragraph IV ANDAs on the
same day share exclusivity. See, e.g., Lietzan & Kom, supra note 55, at 55.
62. GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 43, at 7. Until amended in 2003, the Hatch-Waxman
Act included as a second trigger for the 180-day period a court decision finding invalidity or lack of
infringement. See Lietzan & Kom, supra note 55, at 63.
63. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
64. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 108-391, at 835 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1808,
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generic competition against its antidepressant drug Paxil for more than five
65years.
The 2003 revisions addressed this problem by limiting the stays to pat-
66
ents submitted to the FDA before submission of the ANDA. To be sure,
multiple 30-month stays are still possible. For example, a generic could file
paragraph III and paragraph IV certifications on different patents and then,
before the submission of the ANDA, change the paragraph III designation to
paragraph IV.6' Nonetheless, the change has reduced the problem's fre-
quency.
The second modification was designed to limit abuse of the 180-day ex-
clusivity period. The Medicare Act created various forfeiture events that
resulted in generics forfeiting their 180-day exclusivity period. The events
include the generic's:
* failing to market its drug within 75 days of FDA approval
* failing to market its drug within 75 days of a final judicial decision or
consent decree finding the patent invalid or not infringed
* withdrawing its ANDA
* failing to obtain tentative FDA approval within 30 months of the filing
of the ANDA
* witnessing the expiration of the patents entitling the applicant to exclu-
sivity
68
* entering into an agreement found to violate the antitrust laws.
A close reading of the statute shows that these "use it or lose it" provi-
sions do not necessarily trigger forfeiture as quickly as might be assumed.
Simplifying greatly, the statute provides that the first filer loses exclusivity if
it fails to market the drug by the later of (1) 75 days after FDA approval and
(2) 75 days after an appellate court decision finding invalidity or nonin-
•69
fringement. The exclusivity period thus would extend to the subsequent
court decision, which could occur long after the FDA's approval.
65. GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 43, at 51.
66. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
67. CTR. FOR DRUG EVAL. & RESEARCH, FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: LISTED DRUGS,
30-MONTH STAYS, AND APPROVAL OF ANDAS AND 505(o)(2) APPLICATIONS UNDER HATCH-
WAXMAN, AS AMENDED BY THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZA-
TION ACT OF 2003 8-9 (2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/6174dft.pdf.
68. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i).
69. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (referring to "decision from which no appeal (other than a peti-
tion to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken that the patent is invalid
or not infringed"); see also Erica N. Andersen, Note, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate
over Reverse-Payment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, 93 IowA L. REV. 1015, 1023-24 (2008); Leibowitz, supra note 2. The
forfeiture provisions apply only to ANDAs filed after December 8, 2003 for which no paragraph IV
certifications were filed before the December 8 date. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
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Nonetheless, the changes reduce the likelihood of complete bottlenecks.
This development is strengthened by the Federal Circuit's recent expansion
of declaratory judgment actions. In 2007, this court made it easier for gener-
ics to file declaratory judgment actions against brand companies where
(1) the brand listed patents in the Orange Book, (2) the generic filed a para-
graph IV certification, and (3) the brand sued the generic on one or more of
the patents.70 Although courts have not addressed the availability of such
actions when the brand does not sue the generic, the increased use of de-
claratory judgments could reduce bottlenecks.
Finally, the Act required brand and generic companies to file settlement
agreements that concerned the 180-day exclusivity period or the production,
sale, or marketing of a drug with the FTfC and Department of Justice within
ten days of the agreement.7 ' Representative Waxman sought to ensure the
enforcement of the antitrust laws by requiring disclosure of "secret, anti-
competitive agreements."" Similarly, the Senate Judiciary Committee
explained that the amendments were designed to "put an end to [the] exploi-
tation" by which brand firms abused the Hatch-Waxman law by "[a]greeing
.. . ,,71
with smaller rivals to delay or limit competition.
D. Mixed Success
On the whole, the Hatch-Waxman Act has been successful in increasing
generic entry. Generic drugs, which made up 19% of prescriptions for drug
products in 1984,74 increased to 65% in 2008. . For the most popular drugs
with expired patents, the share facing generic competition burgeoned from
35% in 1983 to almost 100% today.76 And once a generic enters the market,
the brand loses an average of 44% of its market, with one study finding ge-
neric penetration of approximately 75% after two months.7
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1102(b), 117 Stat. 2066, 2460 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21, 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
70. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
71. Medicare Modernization Act, §§ 1112-1113.
72. 146 CONG. REC. E1538 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2000) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
73. S. REP. No. 107-167, at 4 (2002).
74. See Kathleen D. Jaeger, President & CEO, Generic Pharm. Ass'n, Testimony Before the
H.R. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Oct. 9, 2002, available at http://www.gphaonline.org/
resources/2002/1 0/08/greater-access-affordable-pharmaceuticals-act.
75. See Press Release, Generic Pharm Ass'n, GPhA Says New Study Shows that
Hatch-Waxman is a Successful Model for Biogenerics Legislation Exclusivity Provisions Similar to
Those in Hatch-Waxman Would Promote Competition and Innovation (Sept. 17, 2008), http://
www.gphaonline.org/media/press-releases/2009/02/12/gpha-says-new-study-shows-hatch-waxman-
successful-model-biogenerics-.
76. CBO STUDY, supra note 16, at 37.
77. Id. at xiii (44 percent); DOUG LONG, IMS, 2003 YEAR IN REVIEW: TRENDS,
ISSUES, FORECASTS 35 (2004), available at http://piapr.com/presentaciones/DougLong2003YIR
Presentation.pdf (75 percent).
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These trends are amplified by health plans' encouragement or require-
ment of generic drugs.78 Most states allow pharmacists that receive
prescriptions for brand drugs to substitute generics.79 Medicaid policies and
managed-care plans also encourage such substitution. And unlike the situa-
tion at the time of the Hatch-Waxman Act, when an average 3-year gap
existed between patent expiration and generic entry, generics today enter the
market almost immediately at the end of the patent term.8'
Generic entry also saves consumers billions of dollars each year. As the
FTC recently showed, reverse-payment settlements are forecast to cost con-
sumers $35 billion over ten years. 2 Because generics have far lower
development costs, they sell the drugs at a significant discount. The first
generic entrant prices its product, on average, 5 to 25% lower than the brand
drug. 3 The presence of a second generic lowers the price to approximately
half the brand price.84 In markets in which six or more generics enter, the
price falls to a quarter of the brand price. 5 One survey showed that patients
could save 52% in the daily costs of their medications by purchasing generic
drugs."
The Hatch-Waxman Act also has been successful in increasing the pat-
ent term. Nearly half of the top twenty "blockbuster" drugs in 1997 received
extensions of at least two years8 7 The average period of marketing rose from
approximately nine years before Hatch-Waxman to about eleven-and-a-half
years in the early 1990s.
8
Even though generic entry increased after the Act, prices also have re-
cently increased. Prescription-drug spending is the fastest growing segment
of health-care expenditures, increasing from approximately 6% in 1993 to
78. Alden F. Abbott & Suzanne T. Michel, The Right Balance of Competition Policy and
Intellectual Property Law: A Perspective on Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 46
IDEA 1,23 (2005).
79. Id. at 23-24.
80. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 985 (2003), vacated, Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11 th Cir. 2005).
81. CBO STUDY, supra note 16, at 38.
82. Jon Leibowitz, FTC Chairman, "Pay-for-Delay" Settlements in the Pharmaceutical
hdustry: How Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers' Wallets, and Help
Pay for Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion Solution), June 23, 2009, at 8, http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/leibowitz/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf.
83. See id. at xiii; CTR. FOR DRUG EVAL. & RESEARCH, FDA, GENERIC COMPETITION AND
DRUG PRICES (2006), http://www.fda.gov/CDER/ogd/generic-Competition.htm.
84. See CBO STUDY, supra note 16, at xiii.
85. See id.
86. CTR. FOR DRUG EVAL. & RESEARCH, FDA, SAVINGS FROM GENERIC DRUGS PURCHASED
AT RETAIL PHARMACIES (2004), http://www.fda.gov/cder/consumerinfo/ savingsfromgenericdrugs.htm.
87. Engelberg, supra note 47, at 426.
88. CBO STUDY, supra note 16, at 39. The post-Hatch-Waxman term is based on drugs
approved between 1992 and 1995 that received an extension.
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almost 11% in 2003.89 Senior citizens, despite making up only 13% of the
population, account for 42% of all drug expenditures.90 Between 2000 and
2004, the average price of the 100 most frequently dispensed retail prescrip-
tions rose almost 25%, with the price for brand drugs rising three times
faster than the price of generics. 9'
These price increases can be partially explained by agreements by which
brand firms have settled patent-infringement disputes by paying generics to
abandon their challenges and delay entering the market.92 Just as concerning,
the companies have more frequently employed these agreements when en-
forcers and courts look the other way. In particular, the use of reverse
payments plummeted after the FTC first declared its concern with these
agreements in 2000 and skyrocketed after the courts bestowed their blessing
in 2005. 9'
In the years since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the drafters of
the legislation have unequivocally expressed their disapproval of reverse-
payment settlements. Representative Waxman explained that such agree-
ments were an "unfortunate, unintended consequence" of the Act that
"turned the ... legislation on [its] head. 94 Waxman emphasized that the
purpose of the legislation was to promote generic competition, not allow
generics "to exact a portion of a brand-name manufacturer's monopoly prof-
its in return for withholding entry into the market."D
Senator Hatch similarly found such agreements "appalling." Hatch "con-
cede[d], as a drafter of the law, that we came up short in our draftsmanship."
And his assessment mirrored that of Waxman in making clear that "[wle did
not wish to encourage situations where payments were made to generic
firms not to sell generic drugs and not to allow multi-source generic compe-
tition. 96
89. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: PRICE TRENDS FOR FRE-
QUENTLY USED BRAND AND GENERIC DRUGS FROM 2000 THROUGH 2004 1 (2005).
90. FAMILIES USA, COST OVERDOSE: GROWTH IN DRUG SPENDING FOR THE ELDERLY,
1992-2010 2 (2000), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/drugod852b.pdf.
91. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: PRICE TRENDS FOR FRE-
QUENTLY USED BRAND AND GENERIC DRUGS FROM 2000 THROUGH 2004 4, 10 (2005).
92. Motion and Brief for Representative Henry A. Waxman as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at *2, 4, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273), 2005 WL
2462026 (Waxman brief) (noting that brand-name drugs "account for most of the increase in drug
costs").
93. See infra notes 248-253 and accompanying text.
94. Waxman brief, supra note 92, at *v.
95. Id.; see also, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, Keeping Down the Competition;
How Companies Stall Generics And Keep Themselves Healthy, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, § 1, at 1.
96. 148 CONG. REC. S7566 (daily ed. July 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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II. CASE LAW
Four representative cases demonstrate courts' increasing leniency toward
these agreements. In the first case, the court found the settlement to be per
se illegal. But the next three applied much more deference.
A. Cardizem
The first case, In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, involved a drug
used to treat angina and hypertension and to prevent heart attacks and
strokes. 9s In November 1995, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
issued a patent for the prescription drug Cardizem CD to Carderm, which
licensed it to Hoescht Marion Roussel. The next month, Andrx Pharmaceu-
ticals filed the first paragraph IV certification, asserting that its product did
not infringe any patents covering Cardizem. In January 1996, Hoechst and
Carderm sued Andrx for patent infringement. The complaint did not seek
damages or injunctive relief, but triggered a 30-month stay during which the
FDA was not able to approve Andrx's ANDA.
In September 1997, the FDA tentatively approved Andrx's ANDA, indi-
cating that it would finally approve the application when the 30-month stay
expired in July 1998. Nine days after this announcement, and while the pat-
ent infringement litigation continued, the parties entered into an interim
settlement. Andrx agreed not to market a bioequivalent or generic version of
Cardizem (even those not at issue in the litigation) in the United States until
it obtained a favorable, unappealable determination that the patent was not
infringed.99 By filing the first paragraph IV certification, Andrx received a
180-day period of marketing exclusivity. But by not entering the market, it
never triggered this period, creating a bottleneck that blocked other para-
graph IV filers from receiving FDA approval. In exchange for this promise,
Hoechst agreed to pay Andrx $40 million per year, which would increase to
$100 million per year if a court determined that the patent was not in-
fringed.100
The FDA issued its final approval of Andrx's ANDA in July 1998.
Hoechst then began to pay Andrx to refrain from marketing the product.
Two months later, Andrx reformulated its product, and the FDA approved
this version the following year. Upon FDA approval, Hoechst and Andrx
terminated their interim agreement and settled their infringement case, with
Hoechst paying a final sum of $50.7 million, for total payments of roughly
$90 million. Andrx then introduced its generic product, Cartia XT, which
97. 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
98. The facts are taken from id. at 899-903.
99. Andrx also could market its generic version if it entered into a license agreement with
Hoechst or if Hoechst entered into a license agreement with a third party. Id. at 902.
100. The $100 million payment also would be made if Hoechst dismissed the infringement
case or failed to refile the case after a court ruling that did not determine issues of validity, enforce-
ment, or infringement. Id. at 903.
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sold at a significantly lower price and captured a substantial share of the
market.
The Sixth Circuit found that the agreement was per se illegal. It ex-
plained that the settlement guaranteed to Hoechst that "its only potential
competitor" would "refrain from marketing its generic version of Cardizem
CD even after it had obtained FDA approval."'0 ' And it focused on the effect
of the Hatch-Waxman Act. "By delaying Andrx's entry into the market," the
court continued, "the Agreement also delayed the entry of other generic
competitors, who could not enter until the expiration of Andrx's 180-day
period of marketing exclusivity, which Andrx had agreed not to relinquish or
transfer."''0 2 The court also was concerned that the agreement prevented
Andrx from marketing products not covered by the patent. It concluded that
the settlement was "a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition ... a
classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade."'0 3
B. Schering-Plough
The second case dealt with a product used to treat high blood pressure
and congestive heart disease. Schering-Plough manufactured an "extended-
release microencapsulated potassium chloride product, K-Dur 20." Although
the active ingredient in K-Dur 20, potassium chloride, was not patentable,
Schering owned a patent on the extended release coating of the drug. 
4
In 1995, Upsher-Smith Laboratories sought FDA approval to market a
generic version of K-Dur 20. Schering sued Upsher for patent infringement,
and the parties settled the case immediately before trial was to commence in
June 1997. The parties agreed that Upsher would not enter the market until
September 1, 2001 and that Schering would license other Upsher products.
In particular, Schering received licenses to five Upsher products, including a
sustained-release niacin product used to reduce cholesterol.
In 1995, ESI Lederle also sought to market a generic version of K-Dur
20. Schering sued ESI for patent infringement, and the parties settled in
1998. They agreed that ESI could enter the market on January 1, 2004 (al-
most three years before the patent was to expire) and that Schering would
pay ESI $10 million if it received FDA approval by a certain date. Both Up-
sher and ESI remained off the market several years beyond their previous
expectations.
0 5
In 2001, the FTC filed an administrative complaint alleging that Scher-
ing's settlements with Upsher and ESI violated Section 5 of the Federal
101. Id. at 907.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 908.
104. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F3d 1056, 1058 (1 lth Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548
U.S. 919 (2006). The facts are taken from the opinion. See id. at 1058-62.
105. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp. et al., 548 U.S. 919
(2006) (No. 05-273) [hereinafter FTC Cert Petition].
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Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) and Section 1 of the Sherman Act. An
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the settlements were law-
ful. The FTC's complaint counsel appealed this decision to the full
Commission. '0
The Commission reversed the ALJ's decision and, in an exhaustive opin-
ion, held that the settlements violated the FTC and Sherman Acts. 0 7 It found
that the licenses Schering paid to Upsher and ESI greatly exceeded the value
of the products it received.' 8 Even though there were significant safety and
market concerns with one product,'' Schering (1) did not include its knowl-
edgeable employees in the negotiations," 0 (2) failed to request sales
projections or research relating to the drug," ' (3) never followed up on un-
fulfilled requests for information,"2 and (4) did not object when Upsher
suspended its work.' 13 This lack of interest supported the Commission's con-
clusion that Schering paid the generics to delay entering the market."
4
More generally, the FTC explained that it would invalidate settlements
by which "the generic receives anything of value and agrees to defer its own
research, development, production or sales activities."' 5 The Commission
created exceptions to this prohibition for an "agreed-on entry date, without
cash payments" and for payments less than $2 million that could be linked
to litigation costs. 16
The Eleventh Circuit, in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, reversed the
FTC's condemnation. It concluded that "neither the rule of reason nor the
per se analysis [was] appropriate" for the agreements. " ' The emphasis on
anticompetitive effects, in particular, was "ill-suited" for cases involving
patents, which "[b]y their nature.., create an environment of exclusion and
... cripple competition."' 8 The court instead articulated a test that focused
on "(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to
which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompeti-
tive effects."" 9
106. Schering-Plough, 402 E3d at 1061-62.
107. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 ET.C. 956, 1060-61 (2003).
108. Id. at 967.
109. Id. at 1038.
110. Id. at 1019.
111. Id. at1037.
112. Id. at 1043.
113. Id. at 1051.
114. Id. at 1052.
115. Id. at 1062 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. at 987, 1062.
117. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FrC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548
U.S. 919 (2006).
118. Id. at 1065-66.
119. Id. at 1066.
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Pursuant to the first factor, the court found that Schering's patent gave it
"the legal right to exclude Upsher and ESI from the market" until the gener-
ics proved the patent's invalidity or that their products did not infringe the
patent. 2 Neither of the firms alleged the patent's invalidity or claimed that
the infringement suits were "shams."'
2
'
Regarding the second factor, the court found that the agreements did not
restrict competition beyond the scope of the patent. It found Schering's
payment to Upsher for unrelated products to be "a bona fide fair-value pay-
ment."'2 2 And it found that the ESI settlement reflected fifteen months of
mediation as well as "the strength of Schering's case."' 12 The court con-
cluded that the settlement terms were "within the patent's exclusionary
power," and that patentees "should not be in a worse position" than other
parties in settling lawsuits.
24
On the third factor, the court found that any restrictions on competition
were "ancillary restraints" necessary to settlement. '2 The agreement be-
tween Schering and Upsher applied only to products covered by the patent
at issue. More generally, the court stated that reverse payments were "a nat-
ural by-product of the Hatch-Waxman process,"1 6 and that patent litigation
resulted in "a litany of direct and indirect costs" and "decrease[d] ... inno-
vation" by increasing uncertainty in developing patented products.1
27
The court concluded that the agreements "fell well within the protec-
tions of the ... patent" and thus were not illegal. 2 In the end, the court
stated, it "cannot be the sole basis for a violation of antitrust law" for a
brand firm with a patent to pay a generic competitor.1
29
The FTC sought Supreme Court review of the Eleventh Circuit decision,
and was backed by thirty-four states, the AARP, and a patent policy think
tank.'3 ° Reflecting a rare disagreement between the agencies, the Justice De-
partment recommended against granting certiorari. The agency suggested
that the appropriate legal standard "should take into account the relative
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1068.
122. Id. at 1069.
123. Id. at 1071.
124. Id. at 1072.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1074 (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d
188, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)).
127. Id. at 1075.
128. Id. at 1076.
129. Id.
130. Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?,
23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489,491 (2007).
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likelihood of success of the parties' claims."' 3' The Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
C. Tamoxifen
The third case involved tamoxifen, which was used to treat breast cancer
and was "the most prescribed cancer drug in the world.' 32 Imperial Chemi-
cal Industries (ICI) received a patent on tamoxifen in August 1985, and
Zeneca, a former ICI subsidiary, then obtained the rights to the patent and
manufactured the drug. In December 1985, Barr Laboratories filed an
ANDA with the FDA requesting approval to market a generic version of
tamoxifen. In September 1987, Barr amended the ANDA to incorporate a
paragraph IV certification.
In November 1987, ICI sued Barr and Barr's supplier for patent in-
fringement. In April 1992, a district court declared ICI's patent invalid. It
found that ICI had intentionally withheld crucial information from the PTO
regarding safety and effectiveness tests. These tests showed hormonal ef-
fects "opposite to those sought in humans," which could have led to
"unpredictable and ... disastrous consequences."'133
ICI appealed to the Federal Circuit, and while the appeal was pending,
the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Zeneca agreed to pay Barr
$21 million and Barr's supplier more than $45 million if Barr withdrew its
challenge to Zeneca's patent. Barr also agreed, by switching its paragraph
IV certification to paragraph III, not to enter the market until Zeneca's pat-
ent expired in 2002. And it promised to revert to a paragraph IV
certification, which could delay other generic challenges if a court declared
the patent invalid. Finally, the parties agreed to file a motion to vacate the
judgment invalidating Zeneca's patent.
In addition to the challenges to the validity of Zeneca's patent, consum-
ers filed thirty lawsuits targeting the agreement between Zeneca and Barr.
They claimed that the agreement allowed the parties to circumvent the dis-
trict court's invalidation of the patent. The district court, however, granted
the defendant's motion to dismiss, in part because the agreement's termina-
tion of the litigation "cleared the field for other generic manufacturers to
challenge the patent."' 3 4 In fact, however, the settlement removed the most
131. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents' Opposition to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, FIC v. Schering-Plough Corp. et al., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No.
05-273).
132. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2006). The facts are
taken from the opinion. See id. at 193-99.
133. Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Barr Labs., 795 E Supp. 619, 622 (S.D.N.Y 1992).
134. 466 F.3d at 197 (quoting In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 E Supp. 2d 121,
133 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)).
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motivated challenger (the first-filing generic) and also delayed other gener-
ics' challenges. 1
35
The Second Circuit began its analysis by explaining that reverse pay-
ments did not constitute per se violations. The court was "not unaware" of
the "troubling dynamic" in the cases that "[t]he less sound the patent or the
less clear the infringement ... the more a rule permitting settlement is likely
to benefit the patent holder."'' 36 But its concerns were assuaged by relying on
the presumption of patent validity, which ensured that settlement was
"merely an extension of the valid patent monopoly."'37
On the issue of whether reverse payments were "excessive," the court
admitted that it seemed "suspicious" for a patentee to settle litigation against
a potential generic manufacturer by paying "more than either party antici-
pates the manufacturer would earn by winning the lawsuit and entering the
newly competitive market in competition with the patent holder."'' 38 But it
found the suspicion to "abate[] upon reflection."'3 9
It concluded that as long as "the patent litigation is neither a sham nor
otherwise baseless" or beyond the patent's scope, a patentee can enter into a
settlement "to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful mo-
nopoly over the manufacture and distribution of the patented product."'
40
Zeneca's patent litigation, claimed the court, was not baseless or fraudu-
lent.'
4
'
The court then found that the agreement's effects did not exceed the pat-
ent's scope. First, the settlement did not restrict the marketing of
noninfringing products. Because Zeneca's patent "preclude[d] all generic
versions of tamoxifen," any competing version "would ... necessarily in-
fringe the patent."'' 42 Second, by concluding litigation, the agreement
"opened the ... patent to immediate challenge by other potential ge-
neric[s].' 43 Third, the settlement "did not entirely foreclose competition"
since a license from Zeneca allowed Barr to market Zeneca's version of ta-
moxifen eight months after the agreement became effective.'" Even if the
version distributed by Barr sold for only 5 percent less than Zeneca's ver-
sion, the court found that "[t]his was competition nonetheless.' 45
135. Hemphill, supra note 58, at 1584-86.
136. 466 3d at 211.
137. Id.
138. Id. at208.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 208-09.
141. Id. at 213.
142. Id. at 214.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 215.
145. Id. at 216.
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In the end, the court affirmed the lower court's order granting the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss.
Judge Pooler filed a vigorous dissent. She stated that the majority's
"sham" requirement was "not soundly grounded" in precedent and was
"insufficiently protective of the consumer interests safeguarded by the
Hatch-Waxman Act and the antitrust laws."'146 In particular, she pointed to the
important public interest in "having the validity of patents litigated," espe-
cially "in light of the recent trend toward capping the maximum amounts
insurers and public benefit plans will spend on medications."'' 47 And she high-
lighted the difference between the interests of the parties and those of the
public when "the patent has already been shown to be vulnerable to attack and
the generic manufacturer is paid to keep its product off the market."'1
48
Judge Pooler concluded that a reasonableness standard should apply.
Such a standard would rely primarily on the patent's strength at the time of
settlement and secondarily on factors such as the size of the payment, the
amount the generic firm would earn during its exclusivity period, and other
anticompetitive effects. She concluded that the plaintiffs' pleading was ade-
quate to survive a motion to dismiss because of their claims that (1) the
patent's invalidity determination would have been affirmed on appeal, (2)
Barr "received more than it would have through a victory on appeal," and
(3) Barr agreed to "deploy its paragraph IV certification to defeat other po-
tential generic entrants."'' 49 The judge concluded by contrasting the "factual
record not yet in existence" in the case with the "full record" that courts had
considered in other Hatch-Waxman cases.150
D. Ciprofloxacin
The fourth case involved ciprofloxacin hydrochloride, the active ingre-
dient in Cipro, a drug prescribed to treat bacterial illnesses.' In 1987, the
PTO issued a patent covering the compound, and Bayer's predecessor re-
ceived marketing approval from the FDA.
In 1991, Barr Labs filed an ANDA for a generic version of Cipro, which
included a paragraph IV certification that the patent was invalid and unen-
forceable. In 1992, Bayer sued Barr for patent infringement. Just before trial
was scheduled to begin in 1997, the parties settled, with Bayer paying Barr
$49 million in return for Barr's agreement to convert its paragraph IV certi-
fication to paragraph III (thus not entering the market until after the
146. Id. at 224 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 225-26 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 226 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 228 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 232 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
151. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The
facts are taken from id. at 1327-30. See also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363
F. Supp. 2d 514, 518-19 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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expiration of its patent). The parties also agreed that Barr would not manu-
facture a generic version of Cipro and that Bayer would supply Barr with
Cipro for resale or make quarterly payments from 1998 until 2003. Four
companies-Ranbaxy, Mylan, Schein, and Carlsbad-subsequently filed
paragraph IV certifications. Bayer sued each for infringement.
The district court granted Bayer's motion for summary judgment. It
found that Bayer had market power in the market for ciprofloxacin and that
any adverse effects on competition from the agreement were "within the
exclusionary zone" of the patent. 52 It also rejected the argument that a pat-
ent's exclusionary power is limited by the possibility that it is invalid.
The Federal Circuit found no error in the district court's analysis. It of-
fered multiple arguments in support of its conclusion that there was no
liability. First, the agreements only "exclude[d] the defendants from profit-
ing from the patented invention," thus falling "well within Bayer's rights as
the patentee."'' 53 Second, "a patent is presumed to be valid," with patent law
bestowing "the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented inven-
tion." 5 4 Third, a "long-standing policy in the law" favored settlements, with
patent settlements, according to the court, frequently providing that the al-
leged infringer will not challenge patent validity."'
Fourth, the court pointed to the "not unexpected" occurrence under
Hatch Waxman of "a sizable exclusion payment from the patent holder to
the generic manufacturer."'' 56 Fifth, it found "no evidence" that the settle-
ments prevented challenges by other generic firms to the patent.'"7 And
sixth, the Federal Circuit concluded that the "essence of the inquiry" was
"whether the agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary zone
of the patent."'' 58 It found that the agreements did not do so, and that, in the
absence of evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation, the court
"need not consider the validity of the patent."5 9
In sum, the Cardizem court applied the most aggressive scrutiny to re-
verse-payment settlements. On the other hand, the Schering, Tamoxifen, and
Ciprofloxacin courts, as discussed in the next section, applied an excessively
deferential analysis that failed to appreciate the regulatory framework.
152. See 363 F. Supp. 2d at 523-41.
153. 544 E3d at 1332-33.
154. Id. at 1337.
155. Id. at 1333.
156. Id. at1333 n.11.
157. Id. at 1334.
158. Id. at 1336.
159. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS OF COURTS' APPROACHES
Recent courts-in particular, the Schering, Tamoxifen, and Ciproflox-
acin courts-have justified their conclusions on policies of secondary
importance. In addition, they have insufficiently recognized both the
Hatch-Waxman framework and potential antitrust harm of reverse-payment
agreements.
The Hatch-Waxman Act reflects Congress's position on the balance be-
tween competition and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. It was
designed to solve specific problems. It addressed high drug prices and insuf-
ficient generic entry by promoting competition. It dealt with shortened
effective patent terms resulting from changes in the FDA approval process
by promoting innovation. This specific calibration displaces more general
views on the patent and antitrust regimes.'6° Its explicit resolution is espe-
cially helpful given the difficulty of reconciling the patent and antitrust laws.
Recent courts, however, have ignored this specific guidance. They have
taken upon themselves the Herculean task of reconciling competition and
innovation. They have done this even though the legislature's preferred equi-
librium appears before them on the silver platter of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Courts, for example, have emphasized the benefits of settlement and, re-
latedly, the positive effects of settlements on innovation. At the same time,
they have ignored the competition benefits of challenges to invalid patents.
This gets it exactly backward. Innovation-based arguments for settlement do
not appear in the Act's text or legislative history. On the other hand, even a
cursory consideration of the statute underscores the importance of patent
challenges.
Fleshing out these errors, Part III explores the five policies on which
courts have relied in justifying their deference to reverse-payment agree-
ments. These policies have emphasized (1) the importance of settlements,
(2) the link between settlements and innovation, (3) the presumption of pat-
ent validity, (4) the scope of the patent, and (5) the "natural" status of
reverse payments. An appreciation for the Hatch-Waxman framework dem-
onstrates the secondary importance of these policies.
A. Importance of Settlements
First, courts have voiced a general policy in favor of settlement. They
have recognized that settlements conserve resources, provide certainty that
encourages investment, and result in licenses increasing competition. 6' Set-
tlements are particularly beneficial for patent litigation, which is lengthy,
160. See Hemphill, supra note 58, at 1614.
161. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 36 F.T.C. 956, 999-1003 (2003), vacated, Schering-
Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (1lth Cir. 2005); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2.3 (1995).
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complex, and costly.162 For these reasons, the Tamoxifen court explained that
"'courts are bound to encourage' ... settlement[s].', 63 And the court in
Schering found that "{t]he general policy of the law is to favor the settle-
ment of litigation," and that "the policy extends to the settlement of patent
infringement suits.,,64
But reverse-payment agreements are not typical settlements. They are
agreements that dispose of the validity and infringement challenges central
to the Hatch-Waxman scheme. Any general preference in the law for settle-
ment was displaced by the Act's specific framework.
A 180-day period of exclusivity for the first ANDA to challenge a patent
only makes sense in the context of encouraging patent challenges. More-
over, the purpose of the exclusivity period, to ensure that a generic
competitor could not "free ride" on a rival's litigation efforts before the first
filer recovered litigation costs, is not promoted if the litigation never pro-
duces a judgment benefiting other generics.1
6
1
In addition, the 180-day period applies only to ANDA filers that seek to
enter before the end of the patent term. It does not apply to certification
challenges that target expired patents or delay approval until the end of the
patent term. On the other side, the 30-month-stay provision reveals patent-
ees' incentives to file suit after receiving notice of a paragraph IV
certification. 66
Finally, the 180-day bounty itself demonstrates the unique nature of
these agreements. General patent settlements do not prevent other competi-
tors from challenging the patent. In these cases, even if the settling
defendant agrees not to challenge the patent, many others often wait in the
wings to do so. In contrast, the Hatch-Waxman bounty creates a regulatory
barrier to entry that can significantly delay other patent challenges. Compe-
tition's central role is confirmed by the repulsion to reverse payments
exhibited by Senator Hatch and Representative Waxman in the 2003 Medi-
care amendments debate.167
In short, general patent-based policies in favor of settlements must give
way to an industry-specific resolution that encourages patent challenges.
162. In 2007, in patent cases with more than $25 million at risk, each party faced a median
expense of $5 million. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY
2007 25 (2007).
163. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omit-
ted).
164. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 E3d 1056, 1072 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548
U.S. 919 (2006).
165. Engelberg, supra note 47, at 423.
166. FTC Cert Petition, supra note 105, at 4.
167. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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B. Settlements and Innovation
The second principle motivating courts is to defer to settlements so as
not to harm incentives for innovation. The Tamoxifen court stated that rules
"severely restricting" settlements could hamper the patent system's goals by
increasing uncertainty and delaying innovation.'68 Similarly, the court in
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.169 concluded that reduced
settlement options would raise enforcement costs and "impair ... incentives
for disclosure and innovation."' "0 The district court in Ciprofloxacin found
that the inability of brand-name firms to "control or limit their risk" through
settlements could "chill[] efforts to research and develop new drugs" and
lead to "severe consequences for consumers."'' And the Schering court
found that "the caustic environment of patent litigation" could reduce inno-
vation by increasing the "uncertainty around the drug manufacturer's ability
to research, develop, and market the patented product."'
' 72
Any effects of settlements on innovation, however, are secondary in the
context of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The Act, once again, offered a nuanced
equilibrium between competition and innovation. To promote innovation,
the drafters offered patent term extensions, nonpatent market exclusivity,
and a 30-month stay of FDA approval for generics filing paragraph IV certi-
fications. Nowhere in the Act or legislative history did the drafters ever link
settlements to innovation. And since the Act's passage, the drafters' consis-
tently negative reactions to such settlements have confirmed the absence of
such a link.
C. Presumption of Patent Validity
Third, courts have upheld settlement agreements based on a presumption
of patent validity. Section 282 of the Patent Act states that patents "shall be
presumed valid."'' 73 Courts have relied on this presumption to ascertain the
validity that is so crucial to determining the appropriate antitrust treat-
ment."14 A settlement that allows generic entry before the end of the term of
a valid patent promises to accelerate competition. In contrast, a settlement
delaying entry beyond the date the generic could have entered on an invalid
patent could allow the firms to divide the market.
168. 466F.3d at 203.
169. 344 F.3d 1294 (11 th Cir. 2003).
170. Id. at 1308.
171. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F Supp. 2d 188, 256 (E.D.N.Y
2003).
172. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (1 1th Cit. 2005), cert. denied, 548
U.S. 919 (2006).
173. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
174. Courts apply the same patentability requirements-subject matter, novelty, utility, non-
obviousness, and enablement-in determining validity that the PTO applies in initially determining
whether to grant a patent. See id. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2006).
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It is in this context that a substantive role for the procedural burden
plays an outsized role. The Tamoxifen court, for example, found that the
presumption of validity allows parties to settle "weak patent cases" even
though "such settlements will inevitably protect patent monopolies that are,
perhaps, undeserved."'75 The Schering court relied on the presumption in
concluding that a brand firm would not suffer antitrust liability for exclu-
sionary activity unless generics were able to prove a patent's invalidity or
noninfringement. 7 6 And the court in In re Ciprofloxacin asserted that "anal-
ysis of patent validity" is not "appropriate in the absence of fraud or sham
litigation" since "a patent is presumed to be valid."'
' 77
Courts have also relied on the presumption in rebutting assertions by the
FTC and commentators that patents are "probabilistic property right[s]', 78 or
rights to "try to exclude" (as opposed to "right[s] to exclude").' 79 Such an
argument highlights the uncertainty of patent rights and contends that set-
tlements should not leave consumers in a worse position than they would
have been through ongoing litigation. Consumers, in other words, have a
"property right" to the competition that would have prevailed in litigation."8
But courts have rejected these arguments, which "undermin[e] the pre-
sumption of validity that Congress has afforded patents."'' They have found
that settling parties are not required to "preserve the public's interest in
lower prices." They have worried that the probabilistic approach would
have adverse effects on patent licenses, "undermin[ing] the settled expecta-
tions of patentees and potential ... licensees across countless industries.' 83
And they have made clear that "there is no support in the law" for "a public
property right in the outcome of private lawsuits."' Settling parties, in
short, have "no duty to use patent-derived market power in a way that im-
poses the lowest monopoly rents on the consumer."'85
175. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211 (2d Cir. 2006).
176. 402 F.3d at 1066-67.
177. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
178. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 395 (2003);
see also Cristofer Leffler & Keith Leffier, Settling the Controversy Over Patent Settlements: Pay-
ments by the Patent Holder Should Be Per Se Illegal, 21 RES. L. & EcON. 475, 484 tbl.4 (2004).
179. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 75
(2005). See generally Steven W. Day, Note, Leaving Room for Innovation: Rejecting the FTC's
Stance Against Reverse Payments in Schering-Plough v. FTC, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 223, 233-36
(2006).
180. Shapiro, supra note 178, at 396.
181. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 533 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
182. Id. at 541.
183. id. at 533.
184. Id. at 531.
185. Id. at 532.
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For four separate reasons, however, the Patent Act's presumption of va-
lidity is entitled to far less weight than courts have accorded it. First, it is
only a procedural evidentiary presumption. s6 Patentees cannot, for example,
rely on the presumption as substantive evidence in preliminary-injunction
proceedings. As the Federal Circuit has explained, the presumption is a
"procedural device" for allocating burdens of production and persuasion at
trial, not "evidence which can be 'weighed' in determining likelihood of
success" at the preliminary injunction stage.'87 "A presumption of validity,"
as scholars in a recent amicus brief colorfully analogized, "does not entitle a
patentee to evade the test of patent litigation any more than a criminal de-
fendant's presumption of innocence entitles him to avoid trial."1
88
Second, the presumption should be entitled to the least amount of defer-
ence in situations in which the parties enter agreements that prevent validity
from even being challenged. Patent litigation plays an important role in test-
ing weak patents and ensuring that the public does not suffer the adverse
effects of invalid ones.89 The Supreme Court has recognized such an objec-
tive in several cases that have allowed licensees to challenge validity.'98 The
presumption of validity should be particularly weak when the activity at
issue precludes the testing of patents.
Third, confirming the fragile status of the presumption, the Hatch-
Waxman Act's text and legislative history demonstrate the importance of
invalidity challenges. Increasing generic competition was a primary goal of
the legislation. That is why Congress provided a 180-day bounty to the first
generic to challenge a patent's invalidity. Settlements preventing patent chal-
lenges are a particularly inappropriate setting for the presumption.
Fourth, empirical studies have consistently shown that a significant per-
centage of granted patents are invalid. Surveys have found that
• courts invalidated 46% of patents between 1989 and 1996; '9'
• the alleged infringer prevailed in 42% of the patent cases that reached
trial between 1983 and 1999;192
186. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
187. New Eng. Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see
Hemphill, supra note 58, at 1602 n.181.
188. Corrected Brief for 28 Professors of Law, Business, and Economics as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 12, In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (No. 2008-1097).
189. Id.
190. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 264 (1979); United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 57 (1973);
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
191. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (survey limited to cases resulting in a final judgment of
validity).
192. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 385 (2000).
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* in patent cases between 2000 and 2004, courts found that 43% of pat-
ents were invalid and 75% were not infringed.
93
In the context of generic challenges in particular, the rate of invalidity
appears to be even higher. In a study of paragraph IV challenges between
1992 and 2000, the FTC found that the generic prevailed in 73% of the cas-
es and that the brand-name companies won only 27% of the time.' 94 These
figures are consistent with a survey of Federal Circuit decisions from 2002
through 2004 that found that pharmaceutical patentees were successful on
the merits in 30% of the cases.195
This invalidity rate is particularly concerning, and the potential anticom-
petitive effects especially staggering, given the importance of the drugs that
have been the subject of lawsuits. In the FIC study of challenges between
1992 and 2000, sales were far higher in the cases in which brand firms sued
generics. For the seventy-five drug products subject to litigation, the first
generic applicant gained $190 million in median net sales the year it filed its
ANDA.' 96 In contrast, most of the twenty-nine new drug applications that
were not subject to suit had net sales of less than $100 million in the year of
filing."'
Lawsuits have been particularly prevalent on blockbuster drugs such as
Cipro, Claritin, Paxil, Pravachol, Prilosec, Prozac, and Zoloft.'9 In fact, of
the ten top-selling brand drugs in the United States in 2006, at least six
(Nexium, Prevacid, Singulair, Effexor XR, Plavix, and Lexapro) were the
subject of litigation under the Hatch-Waxman Act in 2008.99
D. Patent Scope
The fourth framework on which courts have relied involves the patent's
scope. Courts have tended to uphold reverse payments as a type of activity
falling within the scope of the patent.
The court in Ciprofloxacin found that "[t]he essence of the inquiry is
whether the agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary zone
193. Patstats.org, Univ. of Houston Law Ctr. Decisions for 2000-2004, Issue Codes 1-16, 23,
24, http://www.patstats.org/Composite%20Table%20(2000-2004).html (last visited May 18, 2009).
194. GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 43, at 10, 16.
195. Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1,
20 (2006).
196. GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 43, at 14.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 10-11. See generally Stephanie Greene, A Prescription for Change: How the Med-
icare Act Revises Hatch-Waxman to Speed Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 30 J. CORP. L. 309, 331
(2005).
199. Corrected Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants
at 9, In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2008-
1097).
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of the patent.' '2°° The court in Schering similarly concluded that reverse
payments were "within the patent's exclusionary power."20' The Tamoxifen
court found that the settlement did not "unlawfully extend the reach" of the
patent.2 And the Valley Drug court sought to achieve "[a] suitable accom-
modation between antitrust law's free competition requirement and the
patent regime's incentive system" by immunizing activity within the patent's
203
scope.
The concept of scope, however, cannot do all the work courts require of
it. The overriding question in these cases is whether the patent is valid. If it
is, then an agreement allowing entry before the end of the patent term is
within the scope. But if the patent is not valid, there is no scope at all.2°4 For
that reason, judicial inquiries into the scope or "exclusionary potential" of
the patent assume validity and thus eliminate antitrust concern. As stated
above, the procedural presumption is not sufficient to prove substantive va-
lidity. In assuming the very validity it seeks to prove, therefore, scope is not
an appropriate inquiry.
E. Natural Status
The fifth foundation on which courts have relied is the "natural" status
of reverse payments under the Act. The Schering court explained that
"[rleverse payments are a natural by-product of the Hatch-Waxman process"
and that "patents, payments, and settlement are ... all symbiotic compo-
nents that must work together.., for the larger abstract to succeed."205 The
Tamoxifen court noted that reverse payments were "particularly to be ex-
pected in the drug-patent context because the Hatch-Waxman Act created an
environment that encourages them.' 2° And the Ciprofloxacin court ex-
plained that "sizable" reverse payments are a "not unexpected" occurrence
under Hatch Waxman. °7
Courts are correct that reverse payments have accompanied settlement
agreements under the Act. But that is a far cry from a conclusion that such a
208development is beneficial. In fact, it may reflect no more than the parties'preference for sharing monopoly profits. To consider the point more broad-
200. In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1336.
201. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 E3d 1056, 1072 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548
U.S. 919 (2006).
202. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006).
203. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1307 (11 th Cir. 2003).
204. Andersen, supra note 69, at 1054-55.
205. 402 E3d at 1074.
206. 466 F.3d at 206.
207. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 n. I1 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
208. See Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Dis-
putes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1758 (2003).
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ly, we would not justify collusion in an industry based on rivals' effortlessly
engaging in it. Similarly, the legality of reverse-payment settlements in no
way depends on their frequency.
If the foundations of courts' reasoning are flawed, how should reverse-
payment settlements be analyzed? In the next section, I offer a new frame-
work justifying the presumptive illegality of these agreements.
IV. PROPOSAL
The framework I propose aims to bridge the gap between courts and
commentators. As discussed above, courts have fastened on policies that are
of secondary significance in the context of Hatch-Waxman. In contrast, the
FTC and an array of commentators have sounded alarms about the concern-
ing nature of reverse-payment settlements. 209 But to date, they have not
articulated a construct on which courts have relied in invalidating the
agreements. For example, a focus on a right to "try to exclude" runs head-
long into the presumption of patent validity on which courts have been
transfixed.
My argument for presumptive illegality has five elements:
(1) The existence of Hatch-Waxman's regulatory structure;
(2) The regime's ineffectiveness in promoting patent challenges;
(3) The severe anticompetitive harm of market allocation;
(4) The uniquely concerning nature of reverse payments; and
(5) A rebuttal for reverse payments reflecting reasonable assessments of
patent validity.
Given the first four elements, the default position should be that such
agreements are presumptively illegal. Because these agreements are not
generally procompetitive in nature, deferential review under the Rule of
Reason is not appropriate.2 0 And because some agreements could conceiva-
bly be justified if the reverse payments reflected the parties' reasonable
assessments of patent validity, per se illegality also is not appropriate at this
time.21
209. See, e.g., id.; Hemphill, supra note 58; Shapiro, supra note 178.
210. Pursuant to the Rule of Reason, courts consider an agreement's anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects. In the initial stage of analysis, a plaintiff must demonstrate an anticompeti-
tive effect, typically by showing a defendant's market power. In most cases, plaintiffs cannot make
this showing. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1268 (finding that courts dismissed 84 percent of Rule-of-Reason cases on the
grounds that the plaintiff could not show a significant anticompetitive effect).
211. Courts apply per se treatment---essentially invalidating an agreement once its existence
is shown-to price fixing, bid rigging, and market-allocation agreements, all of which are likely to
lead to competitive harm and unlikely to offer benefits. See MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW
56 (2009).
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A default position that reverse payments are presumptively anticompeti-
tive recognizes the framework and increasing ineffectiveness of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. It also acknowledges the potentially severe anticom-
petitive effects of reverse-payment settlements, which are particularly
suspicious given the aligned incentives of the parties and windfalls received
by generics.
An error-costs analysis of settlements confirms the propriety of the pre-
sumptive illegality approach. There are two types of errors in the antitrust
analysis of settlements. Courts committing Type I errors wrongfully punish
lawful activity such as reasonable payments on valid patents. Type II errors,
in contrast, wrongfully allow illegal activity such as excessive payments on
invalid patents.
In encouraging settlements and giving effect to the presumption of pat-
ent validity, courts have sought to minimize Type I errors. In the process,
however, they have increased the frequency of Type II errors. This is a mis-
take. The Hatch-Waxman framework was designed to encourage patent
challenges, reduce delay in entering the market, and promote generic com-
petition. Type II errors, in allowing parties to delay entry on invalid patents,
fly in the face of the Act's text and intent. The Act's preference for Type I
errors confirms the propriety of presumptive illegality.
Having situated the default position most generally, the remainder of
Part IV fleshes out each of the elements of the framework.
A. Regulatory Regime: Existence and Equilibrium
One of the most important antitrust developments in recent years has
been the Supreme Court's attention to regulatory regimes in determining the
appropriate analysis. As discussed in this Section, the Court has pointed to
such regimes in the telecommunications and securities contexts in down-
playing the need for antitrust enforcement.
The Supreme Court in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V Trinko, LLP 2 2 considered the effect of a regulatory regime on the
application of the antitrust laws. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
sought to break up local monopolies by requiring incumbent local exchange
carriers (ILECs), which had state-provided monopolies in the provision of
local phone service, to share their networks with competitors. The Trinko
case arose when an AT&T customer alleged that Verizon discriminated
against new entrants in the local market."3
The Court found that the 1996 Telecommunications Act "deter[red] and
remed[ied] anticompetitive harm."' 14 As a result, it rejected the plaintiff's
refusal-to-deal claim. The presence of the telecommunications regime sig-
212. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
213. See generally Michael A. Carrier, Of Trinko, Tea Leaves, and Intellectual Property, 31 J.
Corn,. L. 357 (2006).
214. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412.
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nificantly reduced "the additional benefit to competition provided by anti-
trust enforcement."2 5 In contrast, the Court continued, where "nothing built
into the regulatory scheme ... performs the antitrust function ... the bene-
fits of antitrust are worth its sometimes considerable disadvantages.
' 21 6
In addition to considering the role of the telecommunications regime in
fostering competition, the Court more generally described the relationship
between antitrust and regulation. It explained that "[a]ntitrust analysis must
always be attuned to the particular structure and circumstances of the indus-
,,217try at issue. In particular, courts must take "careful account" of "the
pervasive federal and state regulation characteristic of the industry."2 8 The
analysis also must "recognize and reflect the distinctive economic and legal
setting of the regulated industry to which it applies. 2 9
Consistent with this approach, the Court in Credit Suisse Securities v.
220Billing concluded that the securities law regime "implicitly preclud[ed]"
the application of the antitrust laws. In Billing, securities buyers challenged
practices by which underwriting firms forced them to buy additional shares,
pay high commissions, and purchase less desirable securities. The Court
explained that the conduct fell "squarely within the heartland of securities
regulations" 2 ' and that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had
authority to supervise the activities and "continuously exercised" such au-
thority.222 It also pointed to the "complex, detailed line" separating permitted
from forbidden activity and the existence of activity that could be punished
221
under the antitrust laws but upheld under the securities laws.
Just as the telecommunications and securities regimes presented com-
prehensive frameworks, the Hatch-Waxman Act offered an exhaustive
scheme that prescribed Congress's desired balance between competition and
innovation in the drug industry. The drafters used patent-term extensions,
market exclusivity, and 30-month stays to foster innovation. And they cre-
ated a market exclusivity period and revived the experimental-use defense to
promote generic competition. The Act, in short, constructed a delicate equi-
librium that demonstrated the secondary relevance of settlement-related
policies on which the courts have been riveted.
The drafters, for example, did not demonstrate any concern for the rela-
tionship between settlements and innovation. Innovation was an important
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 411.
218. Id. (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 91 (1975)).
219. Id.
220. 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2387 (2007).
221. Id. at 2397.
222. Id. at 2393.
223. Id. at 2394.
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objective of the statute, but it was fostered through other mechanisms, such
as patent-term extensions and nonpatent market exclusivity.
The Act's policy encouraging validity challenges also displaced a gen-
eral preference for settlements. Looking at the marketplace in 1984, the
drafters saw high drug prices and few generics. They sought to increase
competition and obtain early generic entry by implementing a market exclu-
sivity period to encourage challenges to invalid and noninfringed patents.
Reserving this period for generics that wished to enter during the patent
term confirmed the importance of early entry and concern with settlements
delaying entry.
Comparing Hatch-Waxman to the telecommunications and securities re-
gimes that the Supreme Court has considered uncovers modest differences
in goals, from promoting competition (the Hatch-Waxman and telecommu-
nications regimes) to disclosing information (securities regulation). Another
disparity involves the identity of the parties enforcing the regimes. While the
telecommunications and securities acts rely on federal regulators, Hatch-
Waxman depends on generic firms challenging invalid patents. As described
more fully in the next section, however, this enforcement mechanism has
been gutted in recent years as settlements have markedly reduced the re-
gime's effectiveness. As a result, I employ the Trinko framework not to limit
antitrust but to justify its aggressive application.
B. Regulatory Regime: Effectiveness
Before minimizing the need for antitrust, courts must find not only that a
224regulatory regime exists but also that it functions effectively. In Trinko,
Justice Scalia explained that phone companies that provided local service
were required to "be on good behavior" and not to discriminate in providing
access to certain facilities before they could enter the long-distance mar-
ket.225 In addition, firms that did not satisfy these conditions were subject to
financial penalties, daily or weekly reporting requirements, and the suspen-
226sion or revocation of long-distance approval. In Credit Suisse, the Court
noted the SEC's active enforcement, pointing as one example to its detailed
definitions of "what underwriters may and may not do and say during their
224. A contrary position might show less concern with an ineffective regulatory regime, as
such a regime could reflect a deliberate underenforcement strategy rather than a need for antitrust
oversight. See Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation in a Deregulatory
Era 21 (U. Colo. Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-19, 2006), available at http://
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=814945. But deliberate underenforcement does not
appear likely in the Hatch-Waxman context, as revealed by the drafters' hostile reactions to reverse-
payment settlements.
225. 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004).
226. See id. at 412-14. Even if the effectiveness of the telecommunications regime was weak-
er than the Court anticipated, at least the regulators were engaging in some actions that promoted
competition. Carrier, supra note 213, at 369-70.
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road shows" and bringing actions against underwriters who violated the
227
regulations.
In contrast, in the Hatch-Waxman setting, generic firms have recently
been less effective in promoting competition. The drafters of the Act en-
couraged challenges to invalid or noninfringed patents. They believed that
such challenges would lead to earlier market entry and lower prices for con-
sumers. And they assumed that generics could enter the market immediately
upon a judicial finding of invalidity.
Although generic entry has burgeoned in the quarter century since Con-
gress enacted the law, generics are increasingly not serving their designated
function.22' They are agreeing not to challenge patents and not to enter mar-
kets in exchange for payment. Many settlements even provide more money
than the generic could have received by proving invalidity and entering the
market.
The 180-day bounty, in particular, has been twisted from an incentive for
the generic to challenge patents to a barrier to entry preventing challenge.
By settling with the first to challenge under the 180-day bounty, the brand
firm can significantly delay other generics' entrance into the market.
In short, the Hatch-Waxman Act's carefully balanced regulatory regime
is not working as intended to promote competition.
C. Antitrust Harm
Just because the Act is not fulfilling its intended function does not mean
that antitrust should offer assistance. As it turns out, however, the discipline
can play a uniquely effective role in repairing Hatch-Waxman. Such a role is
warranted given the severe anticompetitive dangers threatened by reverse-
payment settlements. Of all the types of business activity, agreements by
which competitors divide markets threaten the most dangerous anticompeti-
tive effects.
Why does market division present more competitive concern than mo-
nopolization, agreements between suppliers and dealers, and price fixing?
Because it restricts all competition between the parties on all grounds. Even
price fixing allows the parties to compete on factors other than price. Where
competitors divide markets, in contrast, consumers are robbed of competi-
tion on all grounds.
The Supreme Court has explained that "[o]ne of the classic examples of
a per se violation ... is an agreement between competitors at the same level
of the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competi-
tion." '29 Courts have consistently found territorial allocations between
227. 127 S. Ct. at 2393.
228. See Hemphill, supra note 58, at 1615; Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for
Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 19 (2004).
229. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
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competitors to be per se illegal.23° In Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc.,231 to
pick one example, the Supreme Court applied per se illegality to an agree-
ment by which competitors divided markets, agreeing not to compete in the
other's territory.232
Settlement agreements by which brands pay generics not to enter the
market threaten dangers similar to territorial market allocation. But instead
of allocating geographic space, in which the parties reserve for themselves
23particular territories, they allocate time. The brand and generic, in other
words, agree that the brand will not be subject to competition for a period of
time, thereby dividing the market and preventing competition. When the
patent is invalid, there is no justification-and thus significant anticompeti-
tive harm-from the agreement.
Nor is it a defense that settlements block only potential competitors not
certain to enter the market. The D.C. Circuit in the Microsoft case recog-
nized that "it would be inimical to the purpose of the Sherman Act to allow
monopolists free reign to squash nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at
will.' ' 23 4 The leading antitrust treatise similarly explains that "the law does
not condone the purchase of protection from uncertain competition any
more than it condones the elimination of actual competition. 235
The anticompetitive harm at issue has human consequences. Artificially
high prices result in patients not filling prescriptions or splitting pills in
half.236 Decisions not to comply with doctors' orders because of high costs
result in pain, more severe medical conditions, and even death . 37 Such
harms are magnified by the blockbuster nature of many of the drugs at the
center of reverse-payment agreements.
Not all patent settlements, to be sure, constitute market-allocation
agreements. If a patent is valid and infringed, the patentee could rely on the
patent itself to restrict competition. In that case, an agreement that allows a
generic to enter before the end of the patent term could increase competi-
tion. On the other hand, if a patent is invalid or not infringed, there is no
legitimate justification for delaying competition. In such a setting, the
agreement serves as a cover for market-allocation agreements.
230. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 103 (6th ed. 2007).
231. 498 U.S. 46(1990) (per curiam).
232. Id. at 49-50.
233. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 968-74 (2003), vacated, Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11 th Cir. 2005).
234. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
235. 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION 2030b, at 213 (2d ed. 2005).
236. Brief for American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8, In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 127 S. Ct. 3001 (No. 06-830).
237. Thomas Rice & Karen Y. Matsuoka, The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Appropriate Utiliza-
tion and Health Status: A Review of the Literature on Seniors, 61 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 415, 420,
427-28 (2004).
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The appropriate antitrust treatment of patent settlements thus depends on
the validity of the patent and existence of infringement. But the most
straightforward way to determine these issues, patent litigation, is not ap-
propriate in this setting. Determining patent validity and infringement would
require significant analysis and testimony on complex issues such as patent-
claim interpretation and infringement analysis. Such inquiries, which could
take weeks, cannot be inserted as mini-trials within antitrust cases.
In addition, an analysis of the merits of the patent infringement case
would be unreliable. After a case settles, the parties' interests become
aligned, with a generic firm lacking the incentive to vigorously attack a pat-
ent's validity or an infringement claim. In the Schering case, the generic had
initially certified that the brand's patent was invalid or not infringed by its
product. After settlement, the generic's views "dramatically changed," with
the chief financial officer testifying that because of the risk posed by in-
fringement damages, the company would not market its drug until the
211litigation was concluded.
Finally, patent settlements in this setting create unique barriers to entry.
Settlements outside the Hatch-Waxman setting typically do not prevent third
parties from challenging patents. In the Hatch-Waxman context, in contrast,
they delay, if not prevent, other challenges. Moreover, after the brand finm
settles with the first generic filer, subsequent generics would be less moti-
vated to pursue a challenge since they would be further behind in the
approval process, would not be entitled to the market exclusivity period, and
would receive a return dependent on the outcome of the first filer's suit.
2 9
Such hurdles loom large given the costs of developing generic drugs and
receiving FDA approval.
D. Reverse Payments
Even if a direct determination of validity and infringement is not appro-
priate, reverse payments offer another option for addressing these issues.
Red flags of potential invalidity are raised when brands pay generics more
than they ever could have gained by entering the market.
Further hoisting such flags are the parties' aligned incentives. Because
the brand makes more by keeping the generic out of the market than the two
parties would receive by competing in the market, the parties have an incen-
tive to split the monopoly profits, making each better off than if the generic
had entered. The generic, in fact, often gains more through settlement than
through successful litigation. Generics have powerful incentives to file the
first patent challenge but little incentive to pursue the litigation.
238. In re Schering-Plough, 136 F.T.C. at 992-99.
239. Hemphill, supra note 58, at 1586.
240. Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Issues in the Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes,
Part 111, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 377, 381 (2007).
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Other types of agreements do not align the parties' incentives as directly.
One example is a traditional licensing agreement by which a generic pays a
brand to enter the market. This resembles the typical settlement that presents
significantly less concern because it leads to more competition. And it pre-
sents different incentives, with the brand seeking higher royalties and the
generic desiring lower payments.
Another example, though slightly more nuanced, involves the determi-
nation of the date of generic entry. Commentators have reasonably viewed
the incentives of the parties as divergent, with a brand firm desiring late en-
try and a generic firm coveting early entry.24' To the extent a generic firm
prefers the certainty of an exclusivity period to its early commencement, the
parties' incentives might be modestly more aligned.242 The reverse-payment
scenario, in contrast, does not offer any deviation from wholly aligned in-
centives.
In addition, reverse payments differ from other regulatory activity and
settlements since the remedies are more likely to lie within courts' expertise.
The Supreme Court in Trinko worried about courts' ability to craft remedies
for unilateral refusals to deal, for which they would need to determine the
assets to be shared and price charged for the shared assets. 24' In contrast,
courts are more likely to correctly analyze agreements between competitors.
They also are able to determine whether reverse payments represent an
objective assessment of the transferred asset's value or an excessive pay-
ment to delay entry. Such an inquiry is easier than other obligations such as
the reasonable-royalty calculation in determining patent damages. Courts
calculating reasonable royalties construct a hypothetical licensing negotia-
tion to determine what the infringer would have paid, considering factors
such as the rate for similar patents, the importance of the invention, and ex-
244pert testimony. In contrast to selecting a reasonable royalty from an
infinite array of potential rates, the inquiry here begins with a single speci-
fied rate and asks whether it appears unreasonable. In the Schering case, the
FIC demonstrated how to execute such an inquiry by exhaustively docu-
241menting the company's lack of interest in the transaction.
Finally, as an empirical matter, reverse payments do not appear neces-
sary to settle disputes between brands and generics. These payments
disappear when challenged and reappear when the antitrust coast is clear.
Between 1992 and 1999, 8 of the 14 final settlements between brands and
241. E.g., Hovenkamp et al., supra note 208, at 1762.
242. Hemphill, supra note 58, at 1593.
243. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 247-
48 (2005).
244. E.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 2018-19 (2007).
245. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 36 ET.C. 956, 1003-53, vacated, Schering-Plough Corp. v.
FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11 th Cir. 2005).
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generic first filers involved reverse payments. In 2000, the FTC an-
nounced that it would challenge such settlements. 247 In the succeeding four
years, between 2000 and 2004, not one of twenty reported agreements in-
volved a brand firm paying a generic filer to delay entering the market. 40
During this period, parties continued settling their disputes, but in ways less
restrictive of competition, such as through licenses allowing early generic
entry.
In 2005, after the Schering and Tamoxifen courts took a lenient view of
these agreements, the reverse-payment floodgates opened. In 2005, 3 of 11
final settlements (27%) between brand-name and generic firms included
249
such payments 9. In 2006, 14 of 28 settlements (50%) contained these pro-
visions.250 And in 2007, 14 of 33 settlements (42%) included such
compensation. 25' Equally concerning, in the past two years roughly 70 to
80% of settlements between brand firms and first generic filers have in-
volved reverse payments.
252
Even if a direct determination of patent validity is not possible, strong
evidence of invalidity is presented by payments from brands to generics that
exceed what the generics could have gained by entering the market. Absent
proof of consideration for a brand's significant payment to a generic, the
quid pro quo for the payment would appear to be the generic's agreement to
defer entry beyond "the date that represents an otherwise reasonable litiga-
tion compromise." '53 Given the severe anticompetitive effects of market
division, courts must search for such indicators.
246. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF
2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2005 4 (2006) [hereinafter FY 2005 AGREEMENTS],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/04/fy2OO5drugsettlementsrpt.pdf.
247. Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Sheila F. Anthony, Mozelle
W. Thompson, Orson Swindle, and Thomas B. Leary, 65 Fed. Reg. 17506 (April 3, 2000), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/hoeschtandrxcommstmt.htm.
248. FY 2005 AGREEMENTS, supra note 246, at 4.
249. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF
2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2006 4 (2007) [hereinafter FY 2006 AGREEMENTS],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/mmact/MMAreport2006.pdf.
250. FY 2005 AGREEMENTS, supra note 246, at 4.
251. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF
2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2007 3 (2008) [hereinafter FY 2007 AGREEMENTS],
available at http:/www.ftc.gov/os/2008105/mmaact.pdf.
252. Id. at 5 (11 of 16 agreements, or 69 percent); FY 2006 AGREEMENTS, supra note 249, at
6 (9 of 11 agreements, or 82 percent).
253. FTC Cert Petition, supra note 105, at 18.
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E. Rebuttal
The last four sections have shown that the appropriate default position
for reverse-payment settlements should be presumptive illegality. But be-
cause in certain cases payments could reflect an objective assessment of the
patent's strength, the settling parties should have the opportunity to rebut
this presumption. In offering such a rebuttal, I conservatively allow the par-
ties to introduce arguments that have been offered in the economic
literature. If judicial experience demonstrates that these arguments do not in
fact justify the payments, then per se illegality might ultimately become a
more appropriate treatment.
An agreement concerning the generic entry date, without any cash pay-
ment, often reflects the odds of the parties' success in patent litigation. By
way of example, if there were ten years remaining in the patent term and
the parties agreed there was a 60 percent chance that a court would uphold
the patent's validity, the mean probable date of entry under litigation would
255
occur in six years.
A brand is likely to gain additional exclusivity by supplementing the
parties' entry-date agreement with a payment to the generic. Continuing the
example above, the brand could pay the generic to gain an additional three
years (for a total of nine years) of exclusivity. The monopoly profits the
brand earned in these three years would vastly exceed the reduced profits it
would earn from sharing the market with the generic. Even with a payment
to the generic, the brand would still come out ahead. And the generic would
also benefit since the payment would exceed the profits it could have gained
by entering the market.
In buying more exclusivity than the patent alone could provide, reverse
payments tend not to reflect an objective assessment of validity. In most
cases, the patentee would not pay more than its litigation costs unless it
256believed it was buying later generic entry than litigation would provide.
That may not be the case, however, when the parties can demonstrate the
reasonableness of the payment. Four potential settings in which the parties
could show this include (1) payments no higher than litigation costs,
(2) "cash-strapped generics," (3) parties with asymmetric information, and
(4) otherwise reasonable payments.
First, if the payment is no higher than litigation costs, it is more likely to
represent an objective assessment of patent validity. Once the brand sues the
generic, each side must pay litigation costs. A reverse payment that does not
exceed these costs does not present significant concern since the parties
254. Robert D. Willig & John P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy Toward Agreements that Settle
Patent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 655, 660 (2004).
255. See Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy,
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1043 (2004).
256. Shapiro, supra note 178, at 407-08.
[Vol. 108:37
Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements
would have been required to spend this money in any event.21' Litigation
costs include a party's out-of-pocket costs and attorneys' fees from the time
258
of settlement until the end of the case.
Second, cash-strapped generics need to receive cash quickly. As a result,
they could insist on entry earlier than the mean probable date of entry.219 But
because the brand company does not share this view, the parties cannot
reach a settlement solely along the dimension of time. The payment of mon-
ey could bridge the gap, allowing the generic to accept a later entry date
while providing it with needed cash.
Third, informational asymmetries could justify reverse payments. One
such asymmetry involves information about the patent's value. The brand
firm could have better information than the generic about the state of the
26,
market and the period of time the patent will have economic value. When
the patent's value is high, bargaining may not lead to agreement since the
brand does not wish to cede its valuable monopoly and the generic insuffi-
ciently appreciates an offer for modestly earlier entry. In this scenario, a
reverse payment could bridge the gap. Although the parties could disagree
over the valuation of potential entry dates, they do not differ on the valua-
tion of cash.262
Fourth, in a more general defense, the parties could demonstrate the rea-
sonableness of any payments. Such a showing could rely on factors such as
(1) sales projections, (2) market analyses, (3) payments for similar products,
and (4) the brand's interest in the product and due diligence. In the Schering
case, the FTC conducted an exhaustive analysis on the issue, ultimately
concluding that Schering's licenses greatly exceeded the value of the prod-
ucts it received.263
Each of these four scenarios could conceivably occur. As a result, per se
illegality is not (at least yet) an appropriate treatment for reverse-payment
settlements. But the identification of particular scenarios in which reverse
payments could be justified is a far cry from a determination that they ex-
plain behavior in most cases. For that reason, commentators' arguments for
why patentees might need to make reverse payments in certain situations do
257. The conclusion is slightly more nuanced since the brand also pays the generic's costs,
which it would not otherwise have paid. Hemphill, supra note 58, at 1594-95.
258. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 208, at 1760 n.177.
259. Schildkraut, supra note 255, at 1059.
260. Id. at 1059-63.
261. Willig & Bigelow, supra note 254, at 660.
262. See id. at 661; see also James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and
Agreements To Settle Patent Disputes: The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments from
Branded to Generic Manufacturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777, 796 (2003) (discussing situation of
generic "hav[ing] private information on its ability to enter").
263. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 FT.C. 956, 1003-53 (2003), vacated, Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 E3d 1056, 1058 (11 th Cir. 2005).
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not demonstrate the propriety of Rule of Reason analysis as a default
framework.
In fact, one model predicted that 92 percent of cases in which reverse
payments were necessary to reach settlement were likely to reduce con-
sumer welfare. 264 Among the cases in which reverse payments were needed,
the surplus loss from inefficient settlements was nearly thirty times the sur-
plus gain from efficient settlements. 265 And given the infrequent need for
reverse payments to attain settlement, the model's authors concluded that
less than one-half of 1 percent of efficient settlements would occur only be-
cause of reverse payments.
266
The Hatch-Waxman framework, drafters' intentions, severe anticompeti-
tive harms of market allocation, and uniquely concerning nature of reverse
payments counsel placing the burden on the settling parties to show the rea-
sonableness of the payments. As a final justification for putting the burden
on the defendants, the settling parties are most likely to have the relevant
information in their possession.
The parties must demonstrate the reasonableness of the payments, typi-
cally by producing sufficient evidence to place the payment in one of the
four recognized categories. As the FFC has suggested, they must show that
the justifications are cognizable and plausible.26' For example, if the parties
rely on a defense of cash-starved generics, they must show that the generic
actually was cash starved and that the support resulted in the generic enter-
2611ing the market earlier than it otherwise would have. If the parties can
introduce such evidence, agencies and courts should uphold the settlement
under the Rule of Reason. In such a case, the reasonableness of the payment
reflects an objective likelihood of the patent's validity.
Putting the burden on the settling parties to demonstrate a payment's
reasonableness also makes sense given the more nuanced agreements into
which firms have recently entered. No longer are brand firms making simple
cash payments for generics not to enter the market. Instead, they are paying
generics for IP licenses, for the supply of raw materials or finished products,
and for helping to promote products.269 They are paying milestones, up-front
payments, and development fees for unrelated products. 270 And, in the latest
264. Leffler & Leffler, supra note 178, at 484.
265. Id.
266. Id.; see also Reply Brief of Counsel Supporting Complaint at 31, In re Schering-Plough,
136 ET.C. 956 (2003) (No. 9297) (F.T.C. Oct. 24, 2002) (explaining that even if a procompetitive
settlement is conceivable, the parties naturally prefer a range of anticompetitive settlements).
267. In re Schering-Plough, 136 F.T.C. at 963-66.
268. Id. at 999-1003.
269. FY 2006 AGREEMENTS, supra note 249, at 4-5.
270. Id.
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trend, they are agreeing not to launch authorized, brand-sponsored, gener-
ics.2"'
Many of these provisions-such as a supply agreement by which a
brand pays a generic even if it does not supply the product-exceed the fair
272
market value for the item. Of particular concern, side payments appeared
in nearly all the settlements that restrained generic entry but few of the set-
tlements that did not."' Nor is the product provided by the generic typically
even one that the brand had sought before the settlement.2 74 In other words,
it is becoming harder for plaintiffs to track down evidence of payments for
delay.27' To demonstrate the reasonableness of these side payments, it would
be necessary for courts to examine product promotion expenses, supply in-
voices indicating the cost of raw materials, the value of IP licenses, and
similar figures.
276
It therefore makes sense to put the burden on the settling parties to pro-
vide evidence of the payments as well as their reasonableness. The parties
would be more likely to possess this evidence and more likely to demon-
strate the transaction's fair market value.
In short, the Act's regulatory barriers to entry and preference for patent
challenges, together with the potential severe anticompetitive effects and
uniquely concerning nature of reverse payments, supports a default position
of presumptive illegality.
CONCLUSION
Reverse-payment agreements present complicated behavior lying at the
intersection of patents, antitrust, the FDA process, and the Hatch-Waxman
Act. Courts have ignored the guidance provided by the Act in emphasizing
policies such as the importance of settlements and presumption of patent
validity.
In this Article, I have shown the importance of Hatch-Waxman in pro-
viding Congress's specific views on the reconciliation of the patent and
antitrust laws. The legislature's finely tuned equilibrium underscores the
271. FY 2007 AGREEMENTS, supra note 251, at 2. See generally C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggre-
gate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Agency Rules to Preserve Drug Competition, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 629 (2009).
272. FY 2006 AGREEMENTS, supra note 249, at 5.
273. Prepared Statement of the FTC Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate,
Anticompetitive Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Benefits of a
Legislative Solution, at 17 (Jan. 17, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/070117
anticompetitivepatentsettlements-senate.pdf.
274. C. Scott Hemphill, Drug Patent Settlements Between Rivals: A Survey 15 (2007), avail-
able at http://ssm.com/abstract=969492.
275. For a recent attempt to do so, see the FTC's 2008 complaint against Cephalon, which
alleged "side-term inducements" (such as licenses to IP, supply agreements, and codevelopment
deals) to generics so they did not challenge its sleep-disorder drug Provigil. Complaint 56, FTC v.
Cephalon, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-00244-RMC (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2008).
276. Andersen, supra note 69, at 72-74.
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importance of generic competition and patent challenges and minimizes the
policies favoring settlement. As the Supreme Court reminded us in Trinko,
courts must consider the applicable regulatory regime in determining the
appropriate antitrust scrutiny. Such consideration is particularly necessary
given the Act's increasing ineffectiveness as reverse-payment settlements
reduce generic competition and patent challenges.
Antitrust can ameliorate this deficiency. Given the severe anticompeti-
tive harm presented by market division and the significant questions
presented by reverse-payment agreements, aggressive antitrust scrutiny is
appropriate. In fact, given the inability of antitrust courts to directly deter-
mine patent validity, the proxy of unjustified settlements provides the best
available evidence of invalidity.
Courts should treat reverse-payment settlements as presumptively anti-
competitive. The settling parties can demonstrate that the payments are
reasonable and reflect an objective assessment of the patent's validity. But in
the vast majority of cases, presumptive illegality will resuscitate the generic
competition at the heart of the Act. Given the importance of the drugs
subject to reverse payments and the far-reaching effects of skyrocketing
health-care costs, a more justified and aggressive framework for such
agreements would offer significant benefits.
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